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Abstract
Because of the work of process philosophers Alfred North Whitehead and Charles Hartshorne, a
view of God has emerged as being in a constant state of flux. The power and knowledge of the
process God are much more restricted than the power and knowledge of the classical God, but
such diminutions supposedly safeguard divine goodness from tyrannical implications. In this
paper, I defend the classical divine attributes against process philosophers. More specifically, I
argue that God’s omnipotence does not diminish divine goodness and that a deity with such
restricted power would not function as a proper object of worship. In the first section, there is a
presentation of the historical and philosophical basis of process theology. The second section
reveals the ways in which process theology has been applied to mysticism, gender equality, and
environmentalism. In the third section, I demonstrate the weaknesses of the process God and
argue for the superiority of the classical notion of God.

Part I
Historical and Conceptual Background of Process Theology
Historical Background of Process Thought
With the central focus on change as key to understanding reality, the ancient Greek philosopher
Heraclitus may be said to be a forefather of process thought (Seibt). His claim that "one could
not step into the same river twice" (Aristotle 1010a 10-15) inspired philosophers like Plato, but
the Heraclitan doctrine would not experience any extensive development until the twentieth
century with the advent of process philosophy (Aristotle 987b).
The philosophy and the theology that subsequently grew out of it is largely indebted to
two men: Alfred North Whitehead and Charles Hartshorne. Before investing himself in

Young 3
philosophy, Alfred North Whitehead (1861-1947) devoted the early part of his career to
mathematics. After studying at Trinity College in Cambridge, England, Whitehead became a
Fellow in mathematics and gained the chair of Applied Mathematics at the Imperial College of
Science in 1910. With his student, Bertrand Russell, Whitehead produced Principia
Mathematica (1910).
As time went on, Whitehead became interested in philosophy of science. With a fourdimensional model of spacetime, he explored the connection between objects and events. His
work evolved into metaphysical investigations of the ways in which objects are influenced by
events. Using the term prehension, Whitehead explained that even inanimate objects receive the
entirety of past events of the universe in each moment. In 1929, just five years after becoming a
philosophy professor at Harvard University, Whitehead published Process and Reality. The
book articulated his idea of the universe as an organism composed of actual occasions, or events.
Part of Process and Reality presented a view of God as having two natures: primordial and
consequent. The dipolar nature of the divine, as well as the metaphysical emphasis on process
over substance, laid the groundwork for much of the work of Charles Hartshorne (Reese 622625).
Hartshorne (1897-2000) was passionate about philosophy. When he served as a medic
during World War I, he brought with him a box of philosophy books. After the war, Hartshorne
studied at Harvard, where he earned a doctorate in philosophy. Harvard was also where he met
Whitehead. During the course of his professional life, Hartshorne worked on developing
Whitehead’s process philosophy into a process theology. In 1928, Hartshorne began teaching at
the University of Chicago. Although he was a professor in the Philosophy Department,
Hartshorne had a much greater influence in the School of Theology (“Charles Hartshorne”).
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For a time, the University of Chicago was a center of process theology. In 1926, Henry
Nelson Wieman gave a lecture on Religion in the Making, a published collection of lectures
delivered by Whitehead. The university, due to its sociohistorical approach to Christianity and
the presence of Hartshorne, produced theologians who borrowed greatly from process thought in
order to reconcile their religious views with an increasingly secular orientation toward life. One
of these theologians, Schubert M. Ogden, published Christ Without Myth in 1961. In his book,
Ogden focused on Christ as the great example of human awareness of and obedience to God's
loving desires for our lives. Also, as the title suggests, Ogden sought to demythologize the
Christ event. John B. Cobb, Jr., another theologian from the University of Chicago, hoped to
bring Whiteheadian thought to a larger audience. Whitehead's Process and Reality was a
philosophically technical book, but Cobb borrowed ideas from Whitehead and used them in such
a way that made them more accessible. In addition to teaching at the School of Theology at
Claremont, California, Cobb published a number of books, such as The Structure of Christian
Existence, Liberal Christianity at the Crossroads, and Is It Too Late? A Theology of Ecology
(Cobb 176-180).
Process thought was later embraced in the areas of feminist philosophy and theology
because of its focus on divine relationality and embodiment. Both Whitehead and Hartshorne
were supporters of women’s rights in their day (Christ 16). In his later life, Hartshorne changed
the pronouns he used for God from the exclusively masculine “He” and “Him” to the genderinclusive “He-She” and “Him-Her” (Christ 17). Mary Daly, a provocative professor at Boston
College, credited Whitehead as one of her influences in her book Beyond God the Father:
Toward a Philosophy of Women’s Liberation (Christ 4). Years later, Hartshorne influenced
Carol Christ, a writer and leader in the Goddess Movement. After Christ published Rebirth of
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the Goddess in 1998, Cobb informed her that much of her book dealt with concepts in process
theology. While Christ admitted that she had done so somewhat unconsciously, she later delved
more deeply into Hartshorne’s works and wrote She Who Changes: Re-Imagining the Divine in
the World (Christ 22-23). The process themes of embodiment, interconnectedness, and
persuasive power that drew Christ and many other feminist theists toward the work of Whitehead
and Hartshorne will be explored in Part II of this paper.
Conceptual Background of Process Philosophy
Although his work would become known as “process philosophy,” Whitehead originally used
the term “philosophy of organism” (Process 18). In his philosophy of organism, Whitehead saw
the world as made up of occasions of experience rather than substances. Whitehead’s occasions
of experience are somewhat like Leibniz’s monads; both actual occasions and monads are the
most basic features of the world. Leibniz’s monads, however, are not directly affected by any
other monads. Each monad is windowless and functions entirely internally. The harmony that
exists between monads (which results in our perception of cause and effect) is the work of the
divine monad. Whitehead’s actual occasions do function internally, but they have windows that
prehend, or unconsciously take into itself, the events of the past (Cobb 19-20).
The occasion of experience begins with its windows open, prehending all the events that
precede its existence. Once the prehension is complete, the windows close and the past events
are processed internally (Cobb 20). The next stage is concrescence, the final formation of past
events within the present occasion of experience. It is at the moment of concrescence that the
occasion is said to “enjoy” existence. Following its enjoyment, the occasion of experience moves
into the past and becomes one of the events that will forevermore influence future occasions of
experience (Cobb 16, 20).
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For example, an occasion of experience that makes up a rock will take in all the past
experiences of the world, but most of those experiences will not be given a significant value for
the rock's present moment. The experience of sunlight hitting the rock, as well as the dripping of
raindrops onto the top of the rock, will be processed as some of the more pertinent past
experiences that feed into the present occasion of experience. Having ordered the experiences of
the past, the occasion of experience will embrace heat and erosion and then go on to inform the
future of the rock as it passes out of existence. If many experiences of the recent past involve the
heat of the sun, for instance, the rock may become steadily warmer over time.
A person, or any other subsisting entity, exists as a chain of occasions of experience.
Even rocks, which are inanimate and appear to undergo little to no change, are composed of
occasions of experience. Both people and rocks prehend the past and shape the future (Cobb 18,
20). While the rock lacks consciousness, its existence as an actual entity reveals its capacity for
prehension. Without prehension, there can be no change, and change is the core identity of
anything that is not abstract (Cobb 14).
As an actual entity, God is also constantly changing. Whitehead claims that "God is not
to be treated as an exception to all metaphysical principles, invoked to save their collapse. He is
their chief exemplification" (Process 343). Such a claim flies in the face of what we will call
"classical theism," a system of thought focused on an eternal, unchanging, and absolutely perfect
God. The classical God exists beyond any of the metaphysical rules that seem to limit creatures.
Creatures have potentiality, but the classical God is pure actuality. The process God has both
actuality and potentiality.
Whitehead addresses the issues of divine actuality and potentiality with a dipolar view of
God. According to process thought, God's nature has a primordial pole and a consequent pole.
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The primordial pole is the "unlimited conceptual realization of the absolute wealth of
potentiality" (Process 343). All goodness, power, and knowledge is held together within the
primordial pole, for it expresses God's ultimate aim. While classical theists may recognize many
elements of the classical God within the primordial pole, Whitehead dismisses this particular
pole as lacking actuality. Conceptual perfection is indeed part of the divine nature, but in its
abstract form, the primordial pole lacks consciousness and feeling (Process 343-344).
The consciousness and feelings of God are held within the consequent pole of the divine
nature. It is there that God prehends all occasions of experience in the world, taking them into
Godself and constantly being changed by them. The consequent pole represents the actual God
that is experienced by all creatures. By prehending all things, the consequent pole brings unity to
the world. From his thoughts on the dipolar nature of God, specifically the consequent pole,
Whitehead developed a set of statements to express his philosophical view of God. Playing with
contrasts, Whitehead declares that "It is as true to say that God creates the World, as that the
World creates God" (Process 348).
The world contributes all occasions of experience to God, and God provides initial aims
for each occasion, which originate in the primordial pole. The divine aims serve as the sources
of novelty in the world, and their intended end is the intensification of feeling and greater levels
of complexity (Process 88, 105). God's aims direct and propel the various evolutions of species
and thoughts. Whitehead describes God and the divine aims as the desires of the world:
He is the lure for feeling, the eternal urge of desire. His particular relevance to
each creative act, as it arises from its own conditioned standpoint in the world,
constitutes him the 'object of desire' establishing the initial phase of each
subjective aim. (Process 344)
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Through the divine desires that God sends out, the world takes on new forms and continues to
develop from simpler states to more complex ones.
An example of Whitehead's understanding of the evolution toward complexity can be
seen in the way that he understands religion. In his four lectures at King's Chapel in Boston,
which were later published as Religion in the Making, Whitehead explores the change and
growing complexity of religion through four stages: ritual, emotion, belief, and rationalism. The
primitive religions of the past originated as communal rituals. Each day, humans perform a
number of rituals, such as taking a shower, driving to work, and cooking dinner. Some primitive
rituals, like hunting and preparing meals, elicited enjoyment and other positive emotions from
people. The rituals later came to be performed not only for their necessity but also for the
emotional response that they produced (Religion 8-12).
Following the lower stages of ritual and emotion are belief and rationalism. Beliefs
develop within communities to give explanations for the emotion-evoking rituals. In this stage,
myths are created to connect the conscious, intellectual mind with the unconscious satisfaction
that comes from ritual. The beliefs sustain the rituals and assign some deeper meaning to the
practices of the past. After beliefs have taken root within a religion, the final stage of rationalism
can take place. Rationalism places the rituals and beliefs within a coherent worldview. With the
advent of rational religion, the religious practices and the beliefs that are centered around them
are able to move from a social, perhaps tribal, model to a more personal, individualistic model.
The reason that envelops the once primitive religion allows for each person to contemplate the
world from the vantage point of his or her religion (Religion 13-22).
Apart from abstract concepts and the primordial pole of the dipolar God, process
philosophy views change as the central feature of the world. As Hartshorne and other thinkers
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coming out of the University of Chicago worked with Whitehead's concepts, the process view of
God also took on a greater level of complexity, growing from a philosophical system to a
theological one.
The God of Process Theology
Charles Hartshorne expanded upon Whitehead’s thoughts about the connection between God and
the world. Resurrecting an idea from Plato, Hartshorne proposes a view of God as the WorldSoul or Divine Organism (Hartshorne 53). Such a view makes process theology panentheistic,
the concept of God intimately containing all of the world within Godself while still transcending
the world (Reese 407-408).
Panentheism differs from pantheism, the idea of the world as identical with God, because
of the divine transcendence that panentheism maintains. Hartshorne uses the relationship
between somatic cells and the human person to illustrate God’s immanence and transcendence.
A person is made up of many cells, but the person is greater than the sum of his or her parts. The
immaterial, rational mind of the person allows for the formation of an identity that extends
beyond a collection of cellular structures. While personal identity creates cellular transcendence,
the person is still very much connected to the workings of the body. If cells are damaged or
destroyed through something as minor as a papercut or a mosquito bite, the person feels the pain.
Suffering within the cells results in a suffering for the person. In a similar way, the divine mind
transcends the world, but God still suffers every sorrow and enjoys every joy that occurs in the
world. The world is God’s body, and we, along with every tree, rock, animal, and atom, are
prehended by the divine mind (Deadwyler 155-157).
Following from Hartshorne's panentheism is his belief in panpsychism, the idea that
everything in the universe has some ability to feel (Reese 408-409). Feelings, in Hartshorne's
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view, are not only psychological emotions and sensory perceptions; they are acts "by which that
which is there, in the object, is conveyed over into what is here, in the subject" (Deadwyler 150).
In order for a panentheistic God to have a relation to all parts of the universe by which the divine
enjoys all experiences, all parts of the universe must have the ability to feel to some degree. A
metal amulet worn against the skin, for example, will feel the heat from the person's skin and,
through that feeling, it will become warm to the touch. In Creative Synthesis and Philosophic
Method, Hartshorne argues that any form of theism that views divinity as the supreme reality
must include the experiential capability of all the universe:
If supreme reality is supreme mind or experience, lesser forms of reality can only
be lesser forms of mind or experience. To introduce mere matter is to destroy the
intelligibility of the doctrine. Mere matter, as the zero of feeling and intrinsic
value, is an absolute negation whose meaning is wholly parasitic on what it denies.
(qtd. in Deadwyler 103)
Unless each part of the world feels experiences, God cannot share in the feelings of the entire
world.
Because of the panentheistic nature of God and the panpsychism that facilitates a
connection between God and the world, Hartshorne ends up rejecting or at least limiting a
number of the classical divine attributes, such as omniscience and omnipotence. Omniscience is
usually considered to mean that God always has perfect knowledge of all things. Hartshorne
affirms that God has perfect knowledge of the past and present because of the divine prehension
of everything in the world; however, Hartshorne denies that God has knowledge of the future
(Hartshorne 26-27).
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The future, in process thought, is the conglomeration of countless occasions of
experience coming to the point of concrescence, and so it is highly contingent. The possibilities
of every occasion of experience and the ways in which they can combine with other occasions of
experience create a continuum for future events. In a continuum, the potential future events are
"infinite, since a continuum is infinitely divisible" (Deadwyler 59). The actual entities that will
exist tomorrow can be any number of the infinite possibilities of the continuum of the future. As
a panentheistic divinity, the process God participates in the world in a temporal way and can
only be said to be eternal through the primordial nature. Therefore, God cannot know what
actual entities exist in the future since those entities do not exist at the moment (Hartshorne 39).
God may have a good idea about what lies ahead and may be able to trace out multiple paths for
the multiplicity of occasions of experience, but the future is beyond the scope of God's
knowledge.
Most pertinent to my thesis is the rejection of God's omnipotence by process thinkers.
The prefix "omni-" relates all power to the divine, but if God has all the power, then there is the
implication that creatures have no power. An adherence to the idea of divine omnipotence
"reduces creaturehood to sheer nonentity. For there to be genuine creations, there must be
creatures of some degree of power, or, what is the same thing, freedom" (Deadwyler 40).
According to Hartshorne, God has the greatest amount of power that God can have without
stripping creatures of power. The power of God is considered unsurpassable by any creature, but
not absolute.
The lack of all power not only preserves creaturely freedom but also provides a response
to the perennial problem of evil. When asked why an all-powerful and all-loving God would
allow evil in the world, a process theist can answer that God is not all-powerful and so does not
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necessarily have the ability to prevent or stop evil. Since a panentheistic God suffers when
anyone suffers in the world, though, God cannot be said to be apathetic to evil. God does not
desire that any evil befall us because God loves us and suffers with us (Christ 95-97). God uses
what divine power is to set certain limits on the potential for disorder in the universe, such as
physical laws (Christ 106). Instead of blaming God for evil, Hartshorne views evil as the result
of both intentional acts of powerful creatures and unintentional "combinations of free acts"
(Deadwyler 42).
Besides the problems that the prefix "omni-" brings with it, there is also the issue of
reconciling divine power with divine goodness. In order to show why omnipotence and
omnibenevolence are incompatible, process theologians divide power into two types: coercive
and persuasive. In "Divine Persuasion and the Triumph of Good," Lewis S. Ford defines the two
types of power as such:
Coercive power directly influences the outcome, since the process must conform
to its control. Persuasive power operates more indirectly, for it is effective in
determining the outcome only to the extent that the process appropriates and
reaffirms for itself the aims envisioned in the persuasion." (Ford 288)
Carol Christ understands coercive power as "power over" and persuasive power as "power with"
(Christ 93). The God of classical theism wields both types of power, but the God of process
theism only uses persuasive power. Process theists like Hartshorne connect coercive power with
the image of God as tyrant. A tyrant uses power to control others and strip them of their freedom,
but a person who uses persuasive power seeks to work with others by encouraging them to
embrace their freedom and foster their creativity (Hartshorne 58-59). The persuasive power of
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the process God can be seen most clearly in the divine aims that are sent out to each occasion of
experience.
Because process theists avoid any connection of God to coercive power, they deny the
doctrine of creation ex nihilo. If God were to create from nothing, then God would need to have
direct, or coercive, power over the being of the world. Instead, process theists envision a state of
absolute chaos from which God brings greater and greater levels of complexity. Cobb defines
the absolute chaos from which the world as we know it comes as a state "in which there is
nothing but very low-grade actual occasions happening at random, i.e., without being ordered
into enduring individuals" (Cobb 65). By influencing the random occasions with divine
persuasion, God can indirectly bring about the existence of protons and electrons. Those protons
and electrons can be influenced into becoming atoms, those atoms can become molecules,
molecules can become cells, and so on and so forth (Cobb 66-67). The denial of creation ex
nihilo opens up questions about the origin of the random actual occasions of absolute chaos, but
it does allow process theists to maintain a consistent rejection of coercive power, which they see
as incompatible with a loving, relational deity (Clarke).

Part II
Implications of the Process View of God
The God of process philosophy is deeply related to the world. Such a close relationship to the
joys and sufferings of human beings, animals, plants, and our planet as a whole has resulted in
new understandings of how we should act. Many theists have incorporated process thought into
their view of God because of the attractive implications of such a philosophy. In this section, I
will explore the application of process theism to mysticism, gender equality, and
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environmentalism. Our concept of God understandably affects our understanding of our
mystical connection with the divine, but our view of God can also shape the way in which we
relate to other people and the earth. The following applications depict religious, social, and
ecological benefits that stem from an acceptance of the process God. While I applaud the work
of the following philosophers and theologians, I will show in Part III of this paper that the
positive effects achieved by process theism are possible in the context of classical theism. More
than that, much of Part III will demonstrate the ways in which the process concept of God is
religiously inadequate and unworthy of worship, despite the positive effects of such a concept of
the divine.
Mysticism
Mysticism is a sense of spiritual union or connection with the holy, divine, or transcendent
(Gellman). In “Rival Concepts of God and Rival Versions of Mysticism,” Daniel A.
Dombrowski argues that a process approach to mysticism explains the experiences of mystics
better than a classical approach. He begins by describing mystical experiences as either indirect
or direct, either unmediated or mediated. As Dombrowski explains it, “[t]he distinction between
indirect and direct experience is that between experience that relies on rational inference and that
which does not, respectively” (“Rival Concepts” 154). An unmediated experience involves no
language or bodily sensations while a mediated experience involves some use of language or
bodily sensation to connect with the holy. Dombrowski claims that classical theism views
mystical experiences as largely direct and unmediated; process theism sees mystical experiences
as direct and mediated (“Rival Concepts” 155-156).
According to Dombrowski, mystics like John of the Cross and Teresa of Avila have been
labeled as classical mystics. The two mystics described themselves as having encountered an
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ineffable God (“Rival Concepts” 157). The ineffability of the divine is deeply connected with
the unmediated nature of classical mysticism. A God who is beyond the scope of our language
and exists as pure spirit may come to us without the use of any medium.
While John of the Cross and Teresa of Avila do exhibit some signs of being classical
mystics, Dombrowski believes that placing them within the context of process mysticism allows
for a better explanation of their experiences. After all, both mystics use physical, even sexual,
language to describe their contact with God. The use of human language and bodily metaphors
suggests that God approached them through a natural medium (“Rival Concepts” 157). If God
had not used a medium, then any record of the mystical experiences would be impossible. An
encounter with the ineffable God must, by definition, be one that cannot be described.
Accepting a process view of mysticism means that one expects a sense of union with the
divine to come through a medium. Even for those who do not consider themselves mystics, there
is often a sense of awe that accompanies events like births, marriages, and deaths. Within such
experiences, God can be experienced (“Rival Concepts” 157). Even more mundane events like a
walk along the ocean or a hug from an old friend can stir up a feeling of enchantment. In such
cases, God is not the ocean or the hug, but God acts through those moments.
The process view of mysticism is one that many theists should be able to support because
they have experienced the divine largely through a medium. The unmediated mysticism of
classical theism, however, remains out of reach for most people, both in terms of understanding
what it means for an experience to be unmediated and in terms of having such an experience
themselves. Dombrowski cites William Alston, who rejects much of the religious naturalism of
process theology, as stating that unmediated mystical experiences are extreme and may often be
reserved for the otherworldly beatific vision (Dombrowksi 162-164). The process concept of a
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God who is embodied within the world's events allows for greater accessbility to mysticism, as
well as greater intelligibility of it.
Gender Equality
Though Hartshorne uses “He-She” when referring to God, process theology has a much deeper
appeal to those seeking gender equality. In her book She Who Changes, Carol P. Christ notes that
the worlds of philosophy and theology have historically relegated women to a second-class status
and that the idea of the process God may remedy such injustice. Inspired by the concept of the
process God, Christ draws connections between the divine and the female body.
As a Religious Studies graduate student, Christ became aware of a tendency to separate
the mind and body in much of the history of philosophy. In an attempt to leave behind the body
negativity of centuries of male philosophers, she embraced the feminism of the 1970s. Her focus
on reclaiming the value of bodies, particularly female bodies, led Christ to adopt a panentheistic
view of the relationship between God and the world (Christ 20).
After studying process philosophy, Christ began to read classical theism as partly a result
of misogynistic thinking. Through the biological processes of menstruation and pregnancy, as
well as the social expectation that women care for both newborns and the elderly, women's
bodies were viewed as both constantly changing and surrounded by change. In a dualistic
philosophical system that favored spirit over matter, the ever-changing nature of women became
associated with matter, while the contemplative nature of men became associated with spirit.
Even though men's bodies did visibly change, the change was viewed as less dramatic than the
physical changes of women. Additionally, several of the changes of men were blamed on
women. For example, the visible changes in a man as blood rushes to his penis and semen is
released were seen as being caused by women (Christ 48-49).
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While Christ recognizes that process philosophy largely began as a way to understand
God in the midst of scientific theories like evolution, she does believe that feminists can adopt
process thought as a way to achieve greater equity for women (Christ 49). As a leader in
women's spirituality and the Goddess movement, Christ calls for women to engage in and
transform the male-dominated fields of philosophy and theology. By creating spaces for
rigorous conversations about the intersections between female embodiment and the divine, Christ
hopes that women can reimagine the divine in a way that celebrates the Divine Feminine and
overcomes philosophies and theologies that negatively portray female bodies (Christ 11-13).
Additionally, Christ sees philosophy as a way for women to interrogate and reflect more
deeply upon their religious practices. Such reflection could lead to greater coherence for a
Goddess-centered worldview. For example, Christ cites the frequent use of tarot cards and other
forms of divination by practitioners of Goddess religions. She believes that divination can be
used for one of two purposes: bringing intuition to the forefront or looking into the future. While
Christ has no qualms about the former purpose, she does worry that the latter purpose forces
those women who practice divination to accept some form of determinism. Unless the future is
fixed, then one cannot read about future events through the use of tarot cards. By having
philosophical conversations about divination, women can think creatively about the role that free
will has in the world (Christ 11).
While Christ and many others honor the Goddess, the image of a male God has come
under scrutiny. Classical theism has largely been responsible for creating the image of God as a
powerful old man in the sky. Although most classical theists would admit that God transcends
human sex differences, the limited image of God remains. As a classical theist, I myself have
attempted to avoid the use of gendered pronouns when writing about the divine, but the
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historically exclusive use of "he," "him," and "his" to describe God has constructed a rigid and
long-lasting image of God as male.
As Mary Daly famously stated in Beyond God the Father, "[…] if God is male, then the
male is God. The divine patriarch castrates women as long as he is allowed to live on in the
human imagination" (19). When the prominent idea of the divine is a male one propagated by
men, women are often relegated to a secondary status relative to men. The secondary status of
women can easily be observed in many religious circles, where women are still prevented from
assuming certain positions of religious leadership. The Roman Catholic Church, for example,
maintains an all-male priesthood. The view of an unchanging, all-powerful male God extends
beyond the doors of houses of worship, though; the misogyny that historically stemmed from
classical theism affects the particular gender roles that society envisions for women and men.
Process philosophy allows for new ideas of God to enter society, breaking down the fear
of female bodies. Whitehead, although he uses masculine pronouns when writing about God,
often describes God as having traditionally feminine traits. John Cobb writes that "Whitehead's
image of the divine patience and tenderness, the one who suffers with us, the one who saves us in
the sense of keeping us everlastingly safe, the final unity that takes all things into itself, lean in
the direction of the feminine" (134).
Hartshorne was more explicit that Whitehead about using feminine images of God.
Besides employing gender-inclusive language, Hartshorne suggests that the image of a mother is
more analogous to God than the image of a father (Hartshorne 60). Because of God's
immanence, the divine is always near to us. A child, both within the womb and newly born,
shares an intimate nearness with his or her mother, a nearness that does not exist with the father.
The analogy begins to break down as the child becomes more independent and the physical
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distance of mother and child increases, but referring to God as "Mother" should be a widely
accepted name for the divine, especially since many already pray to God as "Father" (Hartshorne
54).
In addition to breaking down the idol of the male deity and opening the human mind to a
greater variety of divine images, process philosophy also places change in a sacred context.
Because the divine aims are meant to move the world to higher and higher levels of enjoyment
and intensity of experience, change is not to be feared, but embraced. The process God calls
upon all creatures to cooperate with the divine aims as a way of adding to the glory of God. The
social changes that feminism has created and seeks to create in the future can be understood as
the concretization of the divine will. While not all change is necessarily good, those who fight
against social movements for the sake of maintaining the status quo can be seen as rejecting the
divine aims at work in the world:
Hence, no type of social order is to be maintained if it no longer tends to
maximize the enjoyment of the members of the society. Also, it is impossible for
any form of social order to continue indefinitely to be instrumentally good. God,
far from being the Sanctioner of the Status Quo, is the source of some of the
chaos in the world. (Cobb 60)
While social upheaval may lead to some discord in the world, the process God intends for
change to occur so that harmony might be achieved. The process God, who works only through
persuasive power and never through coercion, can serve as a model for the ways in which
patriarchal, hierarchical institutions might be restructured.
Environmentalism
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Beyond the sphere of human relations, there is much discord in the world. As people continue to
ravage the earth for resources, species continue to become extinct and climate change threatens
to further upset planetary ecosystems. According to process philosophers, such as John Cobb,
the lack of care for the environment stems from a philosophical focus on independence rather
than interdependence. He cites Leibniz and Descartes as promoting independence as a central
feature of reality. Leibniz's monads have no real relations to other monads, except the divine
monad. Descartes, through his definition of substance as that which does not rely on anything
but itself for existence, raised independence to a divine level. Although Descartes identified God,
finite minds, and finite bodies as substances, only God is truly independent. Both finite minds
and finite bodies rely on God for their existence. Other than their reliance on God, though, the
two lower substances were "as self-sufficient as God" (Cobb 21). The independence of beings
draws attention away from the ecological realities of creaturely dependence.
In addition to the philosophical focus on independence, apathy toward environmental
issues can also be attributed to the classical theistic idea of a realm of being and a realm of
becoming. Beginning with Plato, classical theists viewed the realm of being as perfect and
immutable. The realm of becoming, on the other hand, is imperfect and constantly changing
(Ogden 179). Since our planet is part of the realm of becoming, one might decide that it is not
worth much effort to save. The truly important realm is the realm of being, and it is there that
many classical theists have turned their attention. Because of the imperfection of the realm of
becoming, the planet may be seen as merely a conglomeration of resources for humans who are
ascending to the realm of being.
Process philosophy, however, seems to correct the attitudes that contribute to
environmental apathy. The panentheistic God is not above or beyond the Earth's environment,
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but is deeply related to and affected by it. In fact, the connection between God and the world
raises the world to a level of heightened importance:
Because nature and history are nothing less than the body of God himself,
everything that happens has both a reality and an importance which are in the
strictest sense infinite. The ultimate end of all our actions is not ourselves or our
fellow creatures, but the everlasting life of the One to whom no thing is merely
indifferent because each thing is known and valued forever for exactly what it is."
(Ogden 186)
Any work that humans might undertake to preserve and repair the environment directly impact
the divine. Therefore, those who tackle issues like climate change or monoculture are providing
service to God.
Besides highlighting why theists should be more serious about understanding and
benefiting the ecosystems of the world, process philosophy also highlights the intrinsic value of
other creatures. Intrinsic value stems from the ability of creatures to enjoy existence. Once we
recognize that creatures other than humans can enjoy experience, then we must show respect for
those forms of life (Cobb 77).
As an ornithologist, Hartshorne was particularly interested in whether birds enjoyed
singing. He understood that birdsong helped birds with matters of mating and claiming territory,
but he believed that birds sang for more than practical purposes. He noted that even when birds
had mates and territory, they continued to sing. Also, their songs were far more intricate than
one might suppose birdsong would need to be if it only existed as a means of survival (Christ
119). If birds can derive enjoyment from singing, then humans who also enjoy music and other
art forms must honor the existence of birds.
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Even plants deserve some level of respect. Although plants do not have complex ways of
enjoying the world, the individual cells that make up plants can be said to enjoy the basic
experience of existing. The panpsychicism of process thought points to enjoyment as a result of
the concrescence of all occasions of experience. When considering plants, one must also pay
attention to their instrumental value as well. Plants play crucial roles in ecosystems, supporting
much more complex creatures that depend on them for sustenance. Even if one denies that
plants enjoy existence on a cellular level, one must admit that particular animals do enjoy them
(Cobb 78-79).
Process thought draws us out of ourselves and wakens us to the interconnectedness of all
reality. The anthropocentricism that was fostered by notions of independence and the realm of
being must be deconstructed and replaced by a respect for all life. For those already involved in
environmentalism, the process concepts of panentheism and panpsychism can be encouraging.
In any work that we do, we want to feel that we are making a real difference (Ogden 180). Since
God takes all experiences into Godself and all of reality has at least some basic potential for
enjoyment, even small actions like recycling cardboard packaging rather than throwing it in the
trash have an immediate and lasting impact.

Part III
Defense of Classical Divine Omnipotence
As seen by the above applications of process theology, the concept of the process God seems like
a promising way for human beings to better understand their relationship with God, one another,
and the rest of the world. At this point in the paper, I do want to draw attention to some
problems with the process concept of God. There are various philosophical concerns one may
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raise that put into question whether such a view of God meets the needs of robust religious faith.
Despite the positive effects of belief in a process God, there is the issue of accepting a virtually
impotent deity as an object of worship. Using ideas about God that were largely developed by
medieval thinkers, I will now argue that the classical God ultimately serves as a greater source of
peace and justice in the world than the process God and is thus more worthy of worship.
According to Hartshorne, a deity who is worthy of worship "must excell [sic] any
conceivable being other than itself; it must be unsurpassable by another, exalted beyond all
possible rivals" (Hartshorne 8-9). In the following pages, I intend to show that a God with
classical divine attributes is superior to the process God, making the classical God the proper
object of worship.
Because I only have the space to defend one of the classical divine attributes in depth, I
have chosen to defend divine omnipotence because the power of God is an issue that is
mentioned often by process thinkers. The rejection of any semblance of coercive power in the
divine, as well as the assertion that a God with all power necessarily implies a complete lack of
power in any creatures, has greatly limited the idea of divine power. As mentioned in Part I, the
only power of the process God is persuasive. The omnipotence of the classical God is viewed as
tyrannical, while the persuasive power of the process God allows for creaturely freedom and
upholds divine goodness (Hartshorne 14).
Incidentally, if one accepts that classical theism provides a more religiously adequate
concept of the divine than process theism, then the divine simplicity that is a feature of the
classical God necessarily brings together divine omnipotence with all the other classical divine
attributes, such as omniscience and immutability. Divine simplicity defines God as having no
parts. The divine attributes, then, cannot truly be separated from each other. While a
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philosopher may focus his or her attention on omniscience, God’s knowledge cannot be removed
from divine power or goodness. In his book on medieval philosophers, Joseph W. Koterski, S.J.
explains that although "each of the divine attributes that are named separately are distinct from
one another in meaning, each one must also be thought to express the whole of God, even if the
precise manner of their unity as attributes of the one God transcends our imagination" (54).
Before I begin my defense of divine omnipotence, I will explain what it is, and just as
importantly, what it is not. Simply stated, omnipotence is the state of having all power, the
ability to do all things. The ability of God to do all things, though, does not include the ability to
sin or to be acted upon. Any act of sin is, according to Thomas Aquinas in his Summa
Theologica, a falling short of what might have been a perfect action. Since perfection is a
necessary part of the divine nature, God cannot do that which is imperfect (Aquinas I, 3, ad. 2).
Also, God does not have passive power, or the ability to be acted upon. That which has passive
power is deficient or imperfect in some way since it requires some outside force to act upon it.
Since passive power implies imperfection of some sort, it can have no place in God (Aquinas I, 3,
co.).
Divine omnipotence points to God's perfection and self-sufficiency. For this reason, a
deity with omnipotence seems to be a suitable object of worship. The process God, who has
limited power, fails to be a suitable object of worship because such a God can be surpassed by
both the classical God and even human beings. The classical God can offer promises of justice
and an ultimate victory over evil, promises which the process God cannot make. The classical
God's self-sufficiency prevents God from using creatures for God's own benefit, unlike the
process God. The classical God, as well as humans, can surpass the process God through their
use of both coercive and persuasive power.

Young 25
We have a desire for a God who upholds justice, but the process God does not seem
capable of ensuring justice. The lack of coercive power in the process God means that God
cannot have any direct control in the world. The indirect influence of persuasion is available to
the divine, but such persuasion may always be rejected by individuals.
The classical God, though, does not seem to bring more justice to the world than the
process God. The classical God has the ability to directly control events but does not seem to
intervene even in cases of great injustice, such as the Holocaust. The classical God can, however,
promise justice in the afterlife. A child who is born into extreme poverty and then dies at a
young age from a painful disease can find solace in the hope of an immortal existence with a
God who has power over death. While the idea of a heavenly afterlife is largely a matter of faith,
some kind of life-after-death reality seems necessary if theists are to maintain that God truly
loves even those who experience little more than pain and suffering in this world. While the
classical God maintains the ability to intercede for the suffering child due to divine omnipotence,
the process God does not have such an ability.
In a process worldview, the same child can have no hope for everlasting happiness. At
best, she can trust that God has prehended and will retain the relatively few good moments of her
life and suffers along with her in her present moments of pain (Christ 138). A process afterlife is
a cheap version of what the classical God can offer. Process theism offers no ultimate justice
after death, even for those who experience little joy in life. The starving, sick child and the racist,
sexist, greedy business owner who enjoys a life of luxury share the same fate: personal nonexistence after death. While process theists believe that the process God's everlasting treasuring
of all the good we feel and create in the world should be enough, not all theists, myself included,
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are satisfied with so little. What is missing is an intense union with God that is only possible
beyond this mortal life (Clarke).
The classical God can ensure justice for all, if only in the afterlife, as a way of
guaranteeing a final victory over evil. As Immanuel Kant has argued in The Critique of
Practical Reason, there must be a highest good that entails both morality and happiness if we are
to understand this world as good and constantly strive to do our duty. If the good suffer while
the evil prosper, then there needs to be some way of ultimately rewarding the good and restoring
justice (Pasternack). An immortal afterlife provides the opportunity for goodness to eventually
triumph.
As mentioned above, the process God is unable to stop or rectify the evils of this world.
All the process God can do for the world is to send out divine aims and trust that they will have a
good influence, while the world must hope that individuals will cooperate with those divine aims
(Ford 298). On an internal level, the process God can prehend the suffering caused by evil and
bring harmony to the discord through divine creativity. The harmony that is created can be
likened to the sense of beauty and catharsis brought about by watching a tragedy (Ford 300).
The problem with the harmony created by the process God, though, is that the evil has not truly
been eradicated, only internally processed in an aesthetically pleasing manner.
Although the process God seems entirely ineffective beyond the point of human death,
process theists do point out that the process God brings a greater richness to life than the
classical God. The relationality of the process God, in particular, is an appealing feature because
it can be used to make sense of the service that humans provide to the divine. Since God can
surpass some previous state of Godself by prehending the goodness in the world created by
people, human beings can recognize their work in the world as benefiting the inner life of God
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(Hartshorne 7-10). The all-powerful and absolutely perfect God of classical theism, on the other
hand, does not need any service from anyone for divine greatness. Hartshorne questions how a
classical concept of the divine can be reconciled with the sense of value that we attach to serving
God (Hartshorne 8).
I think that serving God does not need to imply some need in God that is being addressed
by humans. Instead, I imagine that humans serving God is somewhat like students serving a
teacher. Students do not answer questions on tests, write papers, or present projects because the
teacher does not have the answers herself or is unable to produce her own academic work. The
students serve the teacher because service to her ultimately serves them. As they do the work
that the teacher assigns, the students become more educated and may even realize their ability for
greater work in the future. If the teacher is understood as analogous to God in this instance, then
human service to God is for the betterment of the humans who choose to serve. The process God
may inspire humans to provide service for the purpose of ensuring some future state of divine
greatness, but the classical God, who has no need for anything, selflessly inspires people to serve
so that they might grow in goodness and holiness. In the case of human service to the divine, the
classical God is more loving than the process God.
Although the classical God does appear to be more just and loving than the process God,
there remains the issue of coercive power. A God with omnipotence would have coercive power,
which is one of the main reasons that process theists so adamantly argue for the view of a limited
God. If the classical God has coercive power, then can that God be loving? Even if one argues
that coercive power does not entirely negate divine love, can one still maintain that a God who
works through coercive power surpasses a God who works only through persuasive power in
terms of love?
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In order to avoid the negative connotations of the word "coercive" in my argument, I will
depend on the more neutral language used by Ford and Christ. In place of "coercive power," I
will use "direct influence" or "power over," and in place of persuasive power, I will use "indirect
influence" or "power with" (Ford 288, Christ 93).
If God cannot have direct influence over the world and be loving, then direct influence
would need to be, always and everywhere, an evil form of power. Direct influence, however,
can be quite good. Suppose that a child is eating a large bowl of ice cream for dinner. Her
parent, seeing the ice cream, tells her that she should eat healthier foods in order to prevent a
stomach ache and grow up stronger. The child refuses to be persuaded by the parent's speech
and continues to eat the ice cream. Realizing that the child is not obeying the parent takes the
bowl and tells her that she must first eat some grilled chicken and vegetables before finishing the
ice cream. The taking away of the bowl is a direct action and a demonstration of the parent's
power over the child. The use of such power, however, is for the good of the child. Even though
the child may consider the parent a tyrant, the good of proper nutrition has been secured by direct
influence on the situation. If there can be goodness derived from direct influence on a human
level, then God, who greatly surpasses humans, should be able to have direct influence over
creatures.
In classical theism, God uses direct influence in order to create and sustain beings. As
the source of being, the concept of God helps to explain the existence of contingent beings.
Divine omnipotence, which includes direct influence, can make a world out of nothing and keep
the world from reverting back into nothingness (Koterski 116).
Process theism, because of its rejection of creation ex nihilo, cannot offer a clear
explanation of the origin of the world. Since the process God does not create from nothing and

Young 29
does not have direct influence over beings, then the process God is not the source of being.
What, then, is the source of being of any of the occasions of experience in a process worldview?
The lack of an omnipotent God requires present occasions of experience to rely on their
predecessors for their existence. The predecessors, in turn, must depend on their predecessors
for existence. Such a pattern must continue ad infinitum since God cannot be relied upon as a
first cause (Clarke). The only way that the process God can be said to create with limited divine
power is through persuading occasions of experience to take on greater levels of complexity.
The power of the process God can be helpful in understanding evolution, but persuasive power
cannot explain the origin of the occasions of experience that first formed protons and electrons
(Cobb 66-67). The lack of a divine source of being prevents process theists from praising God
alone for the world as we know it. At every step along the way, the process God needed to
depend on the cooperation of occasions of experience and could do nothing apart from them.
The process God's lack of direct influence over the world does not only lead to a lack of
intelligibility when trying to understanding the existence of beings; it also makes the creation of
the world as we know it into little more than an avoidance of evil on God's part. In process
theology, there are two main kinds of evil: discord and triviality. Discord is what is usually
thought of when considering evil: destruction, disease, violence, etc. Triviality is that which
decreases the intensity of an occasion of experience (Cobb 70). For example, if divine aims were
sent out to a student to encourage her to become a professional writer but she only ever wrote in
her diary, then she would be guilty of triviality.
Before the beginning of the world as we know it, the random occasions of experience
presented a predicament to the process God. Either God could allow occasions of experience to
continue on without encouraging greater complexity (and thus be guilty of triviality), or God
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could encourage the development of complexity (and thus be partly responsible for the discord
that would follow from more complex beings). The process God's decision to avoid triviality
and opt for the possibility of discord makes the world, or at least its earliest stages, a mere
avoidance of one kind of evil (Cobb 75).
In classical theism, the world is not the result of God's choice between an imminent evil
and a possible one. Instead, the world is a free gift:
Medieval philosophers regularly hold that it is an entirely free act by which God
brings the whole universe, including all matter, into existence by his own choice.
God is not compelled or constrained by anything outside his own nature. Further,
God's action in creation is gratuitous. God's nature is in no way incomplete or in
need of anything that he creates for his own completion or perfection. (Koterski
44)
Rather than looming evil being the impetus for creation (as it is in process theism), divine love
becomes the source of all that is.
By looking at life after death, our service to the divine in this life, and the creation of the
world, the classical God seems to surpass the process God in displaying greater love. By having
omnipotence, the classical God is able to show love for the world in a way that is entirely selfless.
Unlike the process God who constantly depends on a relationship with the world for divine
greatness, the classical God establishes and maintains a relationship with the world solely for the
sake of the world.
Conclusion
The selflessness that is present in the classical God is possible largely because of divine
omnipotence. Part of the appeal of the process God is the lack of divine coercive power, but
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even the direct influence of the classical God that is used in the world demonstrates the way in
which a God who has classical divine attributes is ultimately more worthy of worship. Since the
classical God creates the world ex nihilo, the direct divine influence on the world is the power
that sustains the very being of creatures. The process God does not and cannot sustain the
existence of beings in any direct way. If one accepts that God's omnipotence is linked to God's
love, and is not opposed to it, then other links to classical divine attributes can just as easily be
made. By acting as the first cause of a creature's being, while remaining distinct from creation,
for example, God is shown to have not only the classical divine attribute of transcendence, but
also immanence (Koterski 39-40).
Despite the superiority of the comparative power and goodness of the classical God, its
advocates must still try to address the topics where a process conception is clearly helpful. In
Part II of this paper, process thought was presented as helpful in solving issues like
understanding mysticism, achieving gender equality, and protecting the environment. According
to process thinkers, such issues arose from the inadequacies of classical theism. I do not think
that classical theism is entirely innocent of the allegations that process theists lodge against it,
but I think that problems like apathy to climate change can be corrected by a proper
understanding of classical theism. A radically different concept of the divine is not necessary in
order to bring about answers to the problems discussed in Part II.
First of all, the distinction that Dombrowski makes between classical mystical
experiences and process mystical experiences is too simplistic. Rather than thinking of classical
mysticism as unmediated while process mysticism is mediated, I think that classical mysticism
can occur through both mediated and unmediated ways, just as we experience people in ways
that are both direct and indirect. All that Dombrowski claims about experiencing the process
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God through the natural world can be said about experiences of the classical God. The classical
divine attribute of immanence means that God is very near to all creatures; otherwise, those
creatures would cease to exist. With a classical model of the relationship between God and the
world, unmediated mystical experiences can be understood as emanating from the depths of a
person's being, in which God dwells; mediated mystical experiences can be understood as God
working directly through a worldly medium.
I wonder why all mystical experiences of God must be intelligible, though. If God is
supposedly so far beyond humans, according to both classical and process theists, then it makes
sense that we are unable to provide neat and tidy explanations of God's action in our lives. I
would not expect a dog to fully understand all of my actions. If I admit that some lack of
complete understanding exists in terms of the relationship between a dog and a human, and if the
greatness of God far exceeds the greatness of humans relative to dogs, then the more intelligible
response to mystical experiences is that not all mechanisms of mysticism are going to make
sense to us.
The wonder that arises from an understanding of the greatness of the classical God allows
us to accept that we will never fully comprehend all mystical experiences, but a sense of wonder
could be seen as a kind of virtue. And, returning to a topic discussed earlier, it can also be part
of the solution to gender inequality. In the midst of an omnipotent, omniscient, omnibenevolent
God, men can recognize their smallness in the world. Historically, many men have recognized
themselves as powerful agents, while assigning women a secondary role in humankind. Such an
injustice stems from a distortion of the classical theism that should properly inspire humility and
a sense of grateful dependence in all human beings. While the process God is powerless to
directly act on humans or bring about some final justice, the classical God has the ability to
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ensure that right relationships will eventually overcome relationships founded on notions of
gender inequality. Those who work for gender equality in this world can understand themselves
as being co-workers with the divine, but those who perpetuate injustice in the world, if they are
aware of the power of the classical God, would have to admit that their patriarchal institutions
cannot last forever.
Additionally, an understanding of the classical divine attribute of transcendence should
relativize the image of God as male. A truly transcendent God is neither male nor female. A
God who exists beyond a world in which sex and gender are daily realities is a God who cannot
properly be spoken of with either exclusively male or exclusively female analogies. Such a
realization frees classical theists to embrace multiple images of the divine as the best way of
comprehending the incomprehensible greatness of the divine. Images of the Divine Masculine
and the Divine Feminine should be placed alongside one another as a way of pointing toward the
reality of God. The lack of embodiment of the divine in classical theism prevents one particular
sex from serving as the best or most appropriate image of God.
In addition to addressing the hope for gender equality in our world, classical theism can
also serve to inspire care for the environment. Since the classical God is understood as having
created all things ex nihilo, then all creatures have the same origin and can be said to have some
degree of kinship with one another. Humans have often seen themselves as the pinnacle of
creation, or sometimes even so high above other creatures that humans do not even consider
themselves as part of creation. The created world is then limited to the woods, the meadows, the
oceans, and the sky above. The human-made structures in which we live and work and play
seem to demarcate the division between the natural world and the human world, severing our
connection with the rest of creation. The kinship that humans share with stars and foxes and
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roses, though, can never truly be severed in a classical theistic understanding of the world. Even
if we surround ourselves with human-made structures to such an extent that we never look up at
the sky in which the stars shine or walk on the earth upon which foxes tread or smell the sweet
air that emanates from roses, our connection to the rest of creation would remain intact insofar as
all creation shares the same divine creator and sustainer. An understanding of our kinship with
creation and the wonder that is derived from recognizing the planet as God's beloved creation
can be the basis of greater care for the environment.
These suggestions of ways that classical theism can contribute to issues of the
intelligibility of mysticism, gender equality, and environmentalism are admittedly programmatic
and brief. If the classical concept of God is truly a religiously adequate way of describing the
divine, then the next step for theists should be the application of ideas about the classical divine
attributes to real-world problems. Thoughts about the attributes of God should not end in
classrooms and houses of worship; they should extend into the rest of the world, tending to the
wounds that process theists have valiantly tried to heal. If those who support a classical view of
God as being the most loving and worthy of worship do not act to bring about real change in the
world, though, then all the arguments against a competing view of God will matter very little.
Philosophy and theology do not happen in a vacuum. In the end, the truest testament to the
religious adequacy of the classical concept of God is the love and hope that such a God can
inspire in the world.
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